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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and
test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a
political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula
have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil
would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork
for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of
Congress  to  care  about  economic  growth,  economic  opportunity,  income  equality  and  price
stabilization.  Members  of  Congress  generally  care  more  about  redistributing  gains  to  their
constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative
and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade.
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Section 1 - Introduction 
 
  It is part of the folklore of the democratization process in many Latin American 
countries that the power of the executive should be limited. No doubt this emerged because 
of past abuses. Limiting executive power by giving power to a Congress is not costless. In a 
utopian world representatives should vote for the “good of the country,” but in the real 
world they vote for geographic redistribution, e.g., one member of Congress wants a road 
while another wants an irrigation project. The incentive of the executive differs from that of 
members of Congress; as head of the country the executive is in a position to internalize the 
costs and benefits from policies affecting national interests more so than regional interests. 
As a result of differing electoral connections between the President and members of 
Congress, the President should care more about economic growth and inequality than 
members of Congress. To better achieve these goals, it makes sense to give the executive 
relatively strong powers provided the power is checked, e.g., by a veto in Congress, and a 
free press. When Brazil returned to democracy in 1985 they structured their federal 
institutions of governance in a way that retained strong powers for the President.  The 
transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian government in Brazil during the first half 
of the 1980s was gradual and peaceful rather than revolutionary. As a result many 
institutions continued from the military regime to democracy, most notably for our analysis 
was the retention of strong presidential powers. Had there been a clean break between 
regimes this might not have been the case. We argue that strong presidential powers are the 
key component in the relationship between the president and Congress. It should be made 
clear, however, that we are not claiming that strong presidential powers arose because they Alston 
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facilitate gains to trade, rather they arose historically and have persisted and evolved 
because they benefited those who had the power to change them. 
Within the governance system of Brazil, seven parties currently play a significant 
legislative role. With seven active parties and a weak committee structure one might 
imagine that policy is highly unstable in Brazil. Policy stability is important for economic 
development because it induces private investment, provided the policies are not punitive to 
investors. There may be a fine line between the ability to reform when needed, and policy 
stability. In short, policy stability should not be confused with policy gridlock. One of the 
fundamental dilemmas in all representative democracies is how to induce stability in 
governmental outcomes while maintaining the ability to reform. Governments need a 
certain amount of elasticity in the policy space to adapt to changing domestic or 
international conditions.  
We propose to analyze the mechanism in Brazil for inducing policy reform, along 
with expectations of policy stability. In Brazil parties and committees are far too weak to 
induce stability. Our analysis rests on the existence of strong executive power that in turn 
enables the President to mold a stable coalition in Congress. The coalition then functions as 
a strong party, though with an important caveat: the President is necessarily the leader of 
the coalition. Without the President at the helm of the coalition, it would be inherently 
unstable. Like most cartels, some enforcement mechanism is necessary to ensure 
compliance and prevent defections. Having the President as head of the coalition enables 
him to capture a large part of the gains from trade between the executive and legislative 
branches. Importantly, the electoral connection for the President rests on a strong economy 
and one perceived as satisfying the goals of economic growth, economic opportunity, and 
greater income inequality,  Alston 
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  As is the case of its American counterpart, the Brazilian Congress presents great 
potential for gains from trade, as well as similar kinds of problems concerning the 
enforcement and durability of such trades. Although there is a committee system in the 
Brazilian Congress it does not fulfill the same purpose as that suggested by Weingast and 
Marshall (1988) for the case of the US Congress. Pereira and Mueller (2000, 2004) show 
that party leaders routinely change deputies from one committee to another, even against 
their will, so that having a committee seat does not guarantee property rights over the 
agenda of the committee. Furthermore, bills can be (and are) routinely taken out of 
committee by the College of Leaders.
1 As a result committees are not in a position to 
coordinate legislative exchanges. 
  Similarly parties cannot play the coordination role because there are too many 
parties and no one party is large enough to ensure stability. Currently there are seven 
effective parties in Brazil. It is conceivable that a Congressional institution could arise that 
would enable a cartel arrangement (coalition) to act as a dominant party but so far this has 
not happened and we will argue that it is unlikely to happen given the powers of the 
executive.   
For our purposes the most notable feature that emerged from the Constitution of 
1988 was the extent of legislative powers conferred to the Executive.
2 The powers of most 
importance are: 1) the power to establish the status quo through provisional decrees; 2) the 
sole authority to initiate certain types of legislation, e.g. budgetary and administrative 
issues; 3) the execution of the budget; 4) the ability to appoint a cabinet (though like the 
U.S. this is subject to the approval of the Senate); and 5) immense discretion over 
patronage jobs. We will elaborate briefly on each of these powers.   Alston 
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Provisional Decrees 
The President has the power to change the status quo policy by issuing decrees that 
remain in force for 30 days unless overturned by a majority vote in a joint session of 
Congress. After 30 days the President can reissue the decree. Provisional decrees have been 
used extensively and increasingly since 1988. According to Figueiredo and Limongi 
(2000a: 155), from 1989 to 1997, Presidents issued 446 provisional decrees (without 
counting reissues) and Congress rejected only 3%.
3 Monteiro (2000b) computed the 
number of provisional decrees in effect every month (including reissues) for each bill 
enacted through regular legislative procedures. During President Cardoso’s first and second 
term that number oscillated from 1.8 decrees per regular bill in April 1995 to 6.5 in July 
1999, with a clear increase in the trend over time. The average life of a provisional decree 
over this period was approximately 20 months.
4 
Exclusive Initiation Rights 
The executive has exclusive constitutional rights to initiate budgetary and 
administrative legislation. Budgetary legislation involves the elaboration and subsequent 
changes to the budget. Administrative legislation includes: laws that create new ministries, 
agencies and even public corporations; new positions within the public sector; the mandates 
of the public entities; and the determination of wages within public entities excluding 
Congress and the Judiciary. Presidents use their exclusionary rights often and successfully: 
from 1989 to 1994 the President initiated almost 70% of the 1,259 laws approved by 
Congress from 1989 to 1994 - 41% were budgetary, 10% administrative and 18%   
provisional decrees (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1996: 69).
5 The President also initiated 
successfully an additional 10% of the laws passed in areas over which he does not have Alston 
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exclusive rights. Cardoso continued the same pattern: he initiated 80.5% of all enacted 
legislation from 1995 to 1998 (Pereira and Mueller, 2000: 48). 
Execution of the budget 
The executive office not only initiates the budgetary process but also carries it out. 
After the executive submits a bill to Congress, the legislature may amend it. Many of these 
amendments entail pork barrel projects in a legislator’s district. After Congress as a whole 
amends, the budget goes first through a Combined Budget Committee that prunes out some 
pork.
6 From Congress the bill goes back to the President who has line-item veto power. 
Once a bill is passed the President decides which amendments get executed, based on 
political and budgetary considerations. For example, the President can argue that he will 
not implement an amendment because of insufficient tax receipts to cover the expenditure. 
Discretion over execution gives the President enormous power to reward or punish 
legislative behavior. Ames (1995a) first related budget amendments to roll call votes. 
Pereira (1999) and Pereira and Mueller (2000) provide further evidence that the President 
uses his discretion strategically. 
Cabinet Appointments 
One mechanism by which the President rewards legislative behavior is through 
Cabinet appointments.
7 This power is used throughout a President’s term to reward or 
punish voting behavior in favor of or contrary to the President’s preferences. Cabinet 
appointments are usually distributed to parties, whose leaders then have more means to 
discipline their members. However, in some cases these appointments can go to particularly 
influential individuals who are able to deliver the support of several congressmen.  
Throughout his terms, Cardoso has been explicit about this mechanism in the media, Alston 
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making it well known that the appointment remained contingent on continual support in 
Congress.  
Patronage 
  Patronage positions are numerous. Fleischer (1998) states that the executive 
controls over 40,000 jobs throughout Brazil. These positions range from cabinet positions 
to second and third rank jobs, which in most countries would be civil service appointments. 
Rather than simply rewarding friends who got out the vote, some of these positions go to 
standing members of Congress, suggesting that these positions can bring influence or 
wealth. Indeed in many instances, time spent in Congress is an investment made to secure 
an executive appointment. 
As a result of these five powers the President has dominated the legislative agenda 
both in timing and content. The legislature rarely defeats the proposals of the President.
8  
The preponderance of the Executive in legislative procedures accounts for the claim by 
some scholars that the Brazilian Congress has abdicated its main constitutional authority to 
the Executive.
9  We will argue that this notion goes too far because Congress as a whole 
has the power of veto to resist the Executive’s advances, or even to change the rules that are 
the underpinning of the Executive’s powers. The fact that it has not done so suggests that a 
majority of members of Congress benefit from the status quo as compared to a 
counterfactual world of multiple parties facing a severe collection action problem in the 
legislative arena. The College of Leaders has the potential to organize legislative exchanges 
but it currently lacks any enforcement mechanisms for legislative exchanges. In short, 
outside of the powers of Presidency, there is no apparent extant institution within Congress 
that could improve on the status quo. The powers of the executive fill this void, enabling Alston 
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members of and parties within the coalition to achieve many of the gains from trade that 
arise through other mechanisms (e.g. committees) in other countries.  
Our paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the effect of political institutions 
on public policy and policy outcomes (North and Weingast 1989, North 1981 and 1990, 
Levy and Spiller 1996, Haggard and McCubbins 2001, Dixit 1996, Moe 1990, Spiller and 
Tommasi 2002). More specifically it is concerned with how countries’ political institutions 
affect the trade-off between gridlock and instability that permeates all policy-making 
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Weingast and Marshall, 1988). The way in which the 
political structure maps into the ability to reform and to commit has been a subject of 
growing interest in the literature. Our paper relates closely to several recent strands in this 
literature, particularly those concerned with institutions that determine legislative-executive 
relations. Our focus on the strong powers of the Brazilian president and his ability to 
bargain with a coalition with different preferences is directly related to the notion of 
separation of power and separation of propose in Cox and McCubbins’ (2001) and Shugart 
and Haggard (2001). In this regard we argue that Brazil is an example of political system 
that provides both high levels of governability and responsiveness to the median voter 
preferences. Our analysis can also be seen as a veto player model where the coalition must 
agree with the President’s proposals for them to be realized, much in the spirit of the 
models in Tsebelis (2002). Persson and Tabellini (2000; 239-246) and Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini (1997) provide models that show conditions under which the separation of powers 
between Congress and the president benefits voters by leading to policies that promote 
general welfare rather than private benefits to individuals or groups. Our paper is also 
related to the analysis in Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) regarding how the institutional 
characteristics of legislative-executive relations, such as divided government and party Alston 
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conflict affect the decision by Congress whether to delegate policymaking. Finally, our 
analysis is perhaps most relevant to the comparative literature on the variation among 
presidential systems (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001, Shugart and Carey 1992). We present 
a case study of a coalition-based presidential system with strong presidential powers in a 
context of multiple parties. Although this basic configuration may occur frequently in 
developing countries, the specific details of the Brazilian case lead to a much less common 
result; a divided government that can act decisively and where “pork” does not necessarily 
have significant negative consequences. Understanding the conditions under which this 
occurs is a contribution towards a better understanding of the relation between political 
institutions and policy. 
Our paper also contributes to the specific literature on Brazilian executive-
legislative relations. For the particular case of Brazil there is considerable debate regarding 
how the political institutions affect the costs of governability and consequently outcomes.  
The traditional argument has been that electoral rules based on an open list system lead to 
multiple, fragmented and undisciplined parties, where party leaders are unable to control 
their members’ votes and presidents consequently face high costs in getting their proposals 
approved (Ames; 1995a,b, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart and Carey, 1992; 
Lamounier 1994a,b; Mainwaring 1993, 1999; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). This view 
has recently been disputed by scholars who argue that Brazilian Presidents since the 1988 
Constitution have had remarkable success in enacting their legislative agendas, and that 
parties are disciplined and able to control their members (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000a, 
2000b; Pereira 1999, Pereira and Mueller 2002; Santos 1997).  According to this revisionist 
view, incentives from the electoral arena that push towards individualistic behavior are 
countered by the incentives within Congress that derive from the legislative powers of the Alston 
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President. We argue that not only have Presidents achieved high levels of success in the 
legislative arena but they have done so at relatively low cost. One of the contributions of 
this paper is an explicit model of the micro-foundations of legislative-executive relations 
that are consistent with the revisionist view. 
In the following section we present a model in which a President uses his control 
over the agenda and patronage to pursue his preferred policy.  We stress the trade-off 
between policy outcomes and patronage.  In Section 3 derive several results about the gains 
from trade and who receives the gains. In Section 4 we analyze pension reform from 1995 
to 2004 and data from budget execution as a test of our model. In Section 5 we offer some 
concluding remarks.  
 
Section 2 – A Model of the Brazilian Congress 
In this section we present a model that captures the main elements of the executive-
legislative relationship in Brazil. The important feature of the relationship is the agenda 
power held by the President. This does not mean, however, that the President can 
unilaterally impose his preferences on Congress: a majority coalition can restrict the policy 
preferences of the President. To the extent that the President has a greater electoral 
connection associated with economic growth, stability and national public goods than 
members of Congress it is desirable to give the President relatively strong legislative 
powers. However, to the extent that the President has other goals in his objective function 
or is incompetent, it is important that Congress be able to check the actions of the President.  
Our model is largely driven by the trade-off between policy outcomes and 
patronage, where the outcomes depend on both preferences and on the value of patronage 
to both members of Congress and the President, that is, on the existence of gains to trade. Alston 
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In our model we have five political parties, each of which negotiates directly with the 
President. Although this is often a good representation of reality, as party leaders have 
several instruments to reward and punish their members, in some cases the transactions are 
with individual legislators. The model can be easily adapted to having each of the five 
coalition parties being a legislator in a five member legislature. All legislators belong to a 
political party and parties either belong to the government’s coalition or are part of the 
opposition. Both of these groups interact in congressional proceedings, constrained by the 
legislative institutions, and subject to the powers of the executive. We assume that the 
parties are able to discipline their members.
10 The coalition and the opposition, on the other 
hand, face the usual coordination problems, however the coalition is able to overcome this 
by having the executive at the lead.
11 
Figure 1 shows the preferences of the President (P) and five parties (Ki i=1…5) in a 
two-dimensional space composed of a policy issue on the horizontal dimension and 
patronage on the vertical dimension.
12 The policy can be, for example, the minimum 
retirement age, with the president preferring a higher age than that preferred by each of the 
parties.
13 The patronage dimension measures the value of patronage in the form of  such 
benefits as individual budget amendments, cabinet posts, jobs or cash provided by the 
Executive to each party. Suppose that the number of legislators in each party are such that 
the President needs support of any three parties to have a majority (and a 3/5 majority in the 
case of constitutional amendments.) Thus in this example K3, K4 and K5 will form the 
President’s coalition and K1 and K2 are in the opposition. 
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The horizontal line shown in Figure 1 is the zero-patronage line. The points with 
asterisks are the parties’ preferred policy points along the zero-patronage line. Whereas the 
president’s bliss point is on the zero-patronage line, as he would rather not concede any 
patronage, the parties prefer infinite amounts of patronage so their bliss points do not 
appear in the figure. The points shown with asterisks are thus the projection of their bliss 
points on the zero-patronage line. The ellipses show the indifference curves of each 
legislator to the status quo point SQ. These are labeled as 
) (⋅ SQ
i K , i=1…5, where the 
superscript indicates that the curve represents all the points for which the party is 
indifferent to SQ. All points within the ellipse are preferred by the party to those on or 
outside the ellipse. Thus if the president used his agenda power to propose a policy at his 
preferred point P*, all parties would vote against the proposal. 
  The president anticipates this outcome and thus acts strategically proposing some 
point more palatable to a majority of parties. In order to show which point exactly the 
president would propose so as to improve on the status quo with the least cost in terms of 
patronage, Figure 2 shows a close-up of the previous figure with the point where each 
legislators’ indifference curve through SQ crosses the zero-patronage line labeled 
as
) 0 ( SQ
i K .
14 Without the use of patronage, the best the President could do would be to 
propose a policy at point 
) 0 (
3
SQ K , as this would be preferred to the status quo by both K5 and 
K4 and would be indifferent to K3 (so we assume she would vote in favor). Note, however, 
that the President can do better than this by using patronage. By proposing a policy at point 
B and offering a value in patronage to K3 valued at AB, the president gets favorable votes 
from a majority composed of K3, K4 and K5, and reaches a higher indifference curve than 
would be achieved without the use of patronage ( ) ( ) (
) 0 (
3 A U K U
P SQ P > ). Point A is the best Alston 
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the President can do with this configuration of preferences. Note that although the President 
incurs a higher cost in terms of patronage by proposing A rather than 
) 0 (
3
SQ K , he is better off 
doing so as are K4 and K5. At the same time K3 is indifferent to both situations. Thus the 
President and some parties realize gains from trade by having a policy-patronage point at A. 
  <<Place Figure 2 about here>> 
  In the example portrayed in Figure 2, the president only provided patronage to one 
of the parties. This was a result of the specific preferences portrayed by the indifference 
curves. In Figure 3 we slightly alter those preferences by moving 
) 0 (
4
SQ K  closer to 
) 0 (
3
SQ K to 
show a situation where more than one party receives patronage. In this case, the previous 
solution, policy at B and AB patronage to K3, would no longer defeat the status quo. This is 
because K4 prefers SQ to policy at B. Without giving patronage to K4 the best that the 
President can do is to propose policy at 
) 0 (
4




SQ K to C. However, he can do better than this by giving patronage as well to K4. The 






SQ SQ K K  is the vertical summation of the indifference curves of both 
K3 and K4 and thus shows the amount of patronage that the President would have to 
concede in total to compensate both K3 and K4. The most favorable indifference curve of 
the President is tangent to this curve at point D. The equilibrium in this case would thus be 
for the President to propose policy at point E and to give patronage worth DE in total to 
both K3 and K4. The amount given to each is the vertical distance from E to their 
indifference curve 
) (⋅ SQ
i K , the sum of which equals DE. In this situation K3, K4 and K5 
would vote for the policy and the President’s utility would be U
P(D). Note that if K5’s 
policy prefference moved sufficiently to the left, that party too could receive patronage. 
  <<Place Figure 3 about here>> Alston 
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  The model presented above stylizes the main forces that we believe mold the 
relationship between the executive and its coalition in Congress. There are several 
characteristics of that relationship that are not explicitly addressed in the model that should 
also considered. The first is that the analysis so far has been made in the context of a one-
off negotiation over a single bill; however the relationship is a recurring one involving a 
series of bills and other procedures besides plenary voting. Therefore the exchange of 
support for patronage may not be tallied on a bill-by-bill basis, but rather as the cumulative 
support provided by the party during the legislative year. Only exceptionally is there 
specific negotiation over individual bills that are particularly controversial and high profile 
(some examples involving pension reform are given in section 4). The fact that the 
executive and the coalition play a repeated game helps ensure cooperation, as a party will 
be willing to forgo a chance to cheat on any given bill so as not to upset the relationship. 
Repeated play also limits strategic behavior.  
  Another characteristic of the relationship between the executive and the coalition 
during the two terms of President Cardoso is that the coalition held a supermajority of 
seats, approximately 66% in 1994 and 74% in 1998. This means that it was often the case 
that the executive would be able to pass several bills even without the support of some of 
the parties in the coalition. This fact also mitigates the weight of our assumption that party 
leaders are able to perfectly control their members. Even if some members of each party 
vote against or abstain on any given proposal, the coalition will still be able to approve the 
bill. This allows some parties or individuals to oppose, with the executive’s concurrence, 
some bills that are particularly harmful to their constituencies, thus avoiding the electoral 
cost of supporting the bill. Of course the leeway is less in the case of constitutional Alston 
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amendments, which require a three-fifths majority (60%) and usually involve the more 
important issues. 
 
Section 3 – Gains from Trade in the Brazilian Congress 
  The gains from trade are most easily illustrated in Figure 2. If the legislative 
institutions were such that the President still retained agenda power but did not have the 
ability to offer patronage, then the best he could do would be to propose 
) 0 (
3
SQ K . This 
represents an improvement for all coalition members considered together (President plus 
the coalition parties) compared to the status quo where utilities were the same for K3 but 
lower for K4, K5 and the President. But it is an inferior situation compared to that of the 
President offering patronage, because with patronage the President can improve his position 
and the party are no worse of compared to the status quo. 
  The gains from trade, as always, arise from one actor having property rights to a 
good that is more highly valued by another. That is, they arise when the President gains 
more utility by giving patronage than the utility cost he incurs in doing so, and the parties 
gain more utility from the patronage than they lose by having policy move away from their 
preferred points. Clearly, some issues are sufficiently dear to the parties that it would 
require more patronage than the President would be willing to offer. In such cases the 
President would not even bring the proposal to a vote, which explains why some crucial 
issues, such as political system reform and tax reform, are consistently being postponed. 
Occasionally the President may miscalculate and propose a bill that will be rejected, 
however such cases should be relatively rare. 
  Our model implies that all of the gains from trade go to the President, while the 
coalition parties that receive patronage remain just as well off as they did at the status quo. Alston 
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Coalition parties that do not receive patronage, such as K5 in the example in Figure 3, are 
better off because the final policy improves their utility compared to the status quo. This 
result derives from the agenda power held by the President.
15 If the legislative rules were 
such that the President could not influence the agenda, and assuming that the same coalition 
were able to remain united, then the coalition could propose a bill at its median point and 
have it approved, because it has a majority of the votes to pass the bill and override any 
vetoes. If the legislative rules allowed the President to offer patronage, then he could still 
pull policy towards P, but the final outcome would be further from his preferred point than 
in the case where he had agenda power, as the reversal point would then be the coalition’s 
median preference rather than SQ. It is the agenda power of the President that provides a 
structure-induced equilibrium that prevents cycling problems and provides stability to the 
coalition and policy decisions.
 If the President did not have agenda power and there were 
no other institution that had this effect, such as a strong committee system, we expect that 
the coalition would break and outcomes would become unpredictable. In short there is 
currently no legislative institution that can solve the collective action problem within 
Congress of monitoring and enforcing legislative exchanges.  
In our model the President receives all the gains from trade but we stress that this 
does not imply that he is unconstrained by the coalition. The further apart are the 
President’s and the coalition members’ preferences, the less the President will be able to 
accomplish of his reform agenda. Our analysis also demonstrates that if an incompetent or 
ill intentioned President proposes extreme policies, Congress would check the policies. 
  The major conclusions from the discussion above are summarized in the following 
results: Alston 
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Result 1 – The Brazilian legislative rules are such that there are significant gains 
from trade for the members of the coalition and the executive from the exchange of 
support for patronage. The President’s agenda powers guarantee the stability of the 
relationship and allow him to appropriate most of the gains. 
  The model can also be used to determine the effect of parametric changes in the cost 
of patronage to the President. Providing patronage involves a series of costs that are 
reflected in the inclination of the President’s indifference curves. These costs arise for two 
reasons. The first is the opportunity cost to the President of depleting his capital, since the 
patronage used to purchase support for a given set of causes cannot be used for other ends. 
The second is the efficiency cost that arises from the fact that patronage, by transferring the 
right over specific decisions to members of party Ki, implies that policies and resource use 
in those areas may be distant from those that the President would prefer.
16 The slope of the 
President’s indifference curves measures the cost of providing patronage because by 
definition those curves show how much patronage the President is willing to give in 
exchange for having policy move one unit closer to his preferred point along the no-
patronage line. The greater the slope of the President’s indifference curves at each point 
(that is, the more vertically elongated his preference ellipses) the more he cares about 
policy relative to patronage. Thus, the lower the cost of providing patronage, the greater the 
slope (in absolute value) of the President’s indifference curves and consequently the closer 
will be the equilibrium outcome to the President’s preferred point. In Figure 3 an increase 
in the slope of U






SQ SQ K K  that would yield a 
policy closer to P than E, with more patronage being given to K3 and K4 than DE. 
The shape of the President’s utility curves are primarily determined by his 
preferences for policy versus patronage. However, they are also determined by the Alston 
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institutions in Congress and the Executive, which influence the level of costs that determine 
the amount and quality of patronage a President has to offer, as well as the level of 
transaction costs involved in doing so. In Section 1 we showed that in Brazil political 
institutions endow the President with several means of providing patronage at low cost, 
such as the control of the execution of individual budget amendments by the President. If 
any of these institutions were altered, affecting the costs of providing patronage, the 
President’s indifference curves would change which in turn would lead to a different 
outcome. The effect of a parametric reduction in the cost of patronage to the President is to 
move the policy outcome closer to the President’s preferred point. This happens because 
greater gains from trade can then be realized from the exchange of each unit of patronage. 
Result 2 – Changes that reduce the cost of patronage to the President and the cost of 
transacting with the coalition parties, lead to greater gains from trade, and policy 
outcomes more favorable to the President. 
  Policy outcomes can also be affected by parametric changes in the indifference 
curves of the coalition parties. These curves measure how much patronage a party must 
receive in order to vote for a policy further away from their preferred point and remain just 
as well off. The steeper these curves, the lower the value of patronage to the party relative 
to the value of the policy. Thus the less vertically elongated their preference ellipses, the 
more the parties value patronage. In addition to the parties’ innate preferences for policy 
and patronage, political institutions also influence the shapes of their indifference curves. 
Changes in legislative or electoral rules, or changes in the voters’ preferences or behavior, 
may alter those curves. In Figure 3, a parametric increase in the value of patronage to the 
parties implies flatter indifference curves and consequently more favorable policy outcomes 
to the President. For example, if the President is undergoing a period of intense popularity Alston 
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it will be more valuable for a party or individual to hold or control a governmental post, as 
this popularity may rub off onto those seen by the electorate as participating in the 
government. As another example, the easier it is for the legislators to use patronage so as to 
benefit themselves, the more highly it will be valued. If the country’s institutions make it 
more acceptable for a legislator to derive rents from a pork barrel project taken home, then 
the execution of a personal amendment to the budget is more valuable to a legislator. 
Result 3 – The larger the benefit that the members of the coalition are able to derive 
from a given amount of patronage, the greater the gains from trade and the more 
favorable will be policy outcomes to the Executive. 
 
  Finally, a perhaps counterintuitive implication of our model is that the President 
will have to offer more compensation to those coalition parties that are further from his 
preferences. In Figure 3, for example, K3 is the furthest from P and received the majority of 
patrontage, DE, the total amount of patronage that was given. K4 was more aligned with the 
President than K3 but nevertheless received less patronage. And K5 , who was even closer to 
P received no patronage at all.
17 K1 and K2 who are not part of the coalition also received 
no patronage. In this regard our model has a similar implication to the model in Snyder Jr. 
(1991):  “in order to obtain favorable legislation the president should allocate the 
distributive benefits he has at his disposal to the congressmen who are slightly opposed to 
his proposal.”
18 In the following section we will test this implication with data on patronage 
distribution.   
Result 4 – The further the preference of a coalition party from that of the President, 
the greater the patronage that party will receive. Therefore coalition parties that 
have more divergent preferences from those of the President will receive, ceteris Alston 
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paribus, more compensation than those parties closer to the President up to the 
point where the President has the number of votes that he needs.  
 
Section 4 – Evidence from Pension Reform  
  The success rate of the Brazilian Executive in getting its projects approved in 
Congress has been impressive. Of the 1,881 bills presented by the various Presidents from 
1989 to 1997, 77% were approved and only 1.3% were rejected, the remaining having been 
withdrawn or still in progress (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000a; 155). The performance of 
the Cardoso Presidency has been even stronger with an approval of 95.3% of its proposals 
in the House during his second term (Jornal do Brasil, 2001). At first sight this record may 
lead one to believe that the Executive is able to pursue its agenda with practically no 
interference from Congress. However, the same outcome can also be explained by a 
relationship between the Executive and the Legislature as modeled in the previous section. 
The Executive achieves a high rate of success in getting its proposals approved through its 
power to set the agenda together with the strategic use of patronage. Providing evidence to 
support this model is not easy, because a high rate of approval is predicted by both 
hypotheses.
19 
The percentage of Presidential bills approved per se does not provide much 
information on the prior explicit and implicit bargaining between the Executive and 
Congress in order to assure approval. For many proposals the preferences of the coalition 
are close to the preference of the President and approval follows without bargaining.  In 
other cases preferences are further apart but the combination of patronage and compromise 
in changing the policy leads to approval. In still other cases the preferences are so divergent Alston 
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that no such compromise is feasible. When the President perceives preferences as widely 
divergent, he most likely will withhold the proposal rather than face defeat. 
According to our first result, there are significant gains from trade from the 
exchange of support for patronage. Evidence of patronage should be particularly visible in 
those instances where preferences diverged but not so much as to rule out exchanges. We 
should expect to find that the voting behavior of members of the coalition are rewarded and 
punished by the Executive in the following ways: (i) granting or removing the right to make 
appointments to patronage positions and (ii) executing or failing to execute the amendments 
in the budget related to specific legislators. Although there is systematic data available on 
individual amendments (which we describe below), there is no systematic data on posts in 
the federal government that have been assigned to deputies. It is usually quite clear which 
political party, and sometimes even which individual within a party, has been given 
property rights to appoint cabinet members and several other high-ranking positions. Even 
with lower positions, such as the head and directors of local branches of many federal 
companies, pundits and the press will often comment on which congressman choose the 
appointee. However, given the huge number of posts available for negotiation (Fleischer 
1998, estimates this number at 40,000), the unofficial nature of the link between patron and 
appointee and transitory nature of appointments, it is very difficult to collect systematic 
information. 
To test the hypotheses from the previous section we will look at pension reform 
during both Cardoso terms, 1995-2002. Our strategy is to associate the use of patronage 
with specific instances when Congress voted on divisive issues. This will be done in two 
ways; the first using evidence from the press and the second econometrically testing the 
determinants of the execution by the President of the amendments to the budget proposed Alston 
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by Congressmen. We choose pension reform because it is a key element in any plan for 
economic growth and stabilization, and it has been by far the most contentious issue 
discussed in Congress in the past ten years. Cardoso sent his first proposal on pension 
reform to Congress in March 1995, shortly after he took office, and in eight years achieved 
only limited reform. President Lula who took office in January 2003 chose pension reform 
as the first major reform to be tackled. (See Table 1 for a chronology of activity.) 
At first sight, the choice of focusing on pension reform may seem odd, as this is the 
major reform where the President was able to approve less of his initial proposal. 
Resistance by Congress not only forced compromises in terms of policy proposal changes, 
but even those proposals that did get through did so with great difficulty. Given that we are 
arguing that the Brazilian system provides high levels of governability at relatively low 
cost, pension reform would seem to be proof of just the opposite. However, the advantage 
of focusing of pension reform is that this is perhaps the issue over which the preferences of 
President Cardoso and his coalition most differed, but where nevertheless the President 
insisted in pushing forward. Whereas most other issues appeared to be routinely approved 
without much scrutiny from Congress, resulting in the high success rates for the President 
described above, in this issue conflicts are more visible and it becomes easier to analyze 
how these are dealt with. Given the critical state of the Brazilian pension system, any 
reform would necessarily involve diminishing benefits considered as an acquired right by 
most of society. The upshot was that practically all voters, and especially several well-
organized groups such as civil servants, military and judges, strongly opposed. Therefore 
congressmen were very reluctant to be seen as supporting the reform, and what ensued was 
the negotiation between the President and Congress that is described below. That Cardoso 
insisted in the reforms, and that President Lula has done the same, despite its electoral Alston 
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unpopularity, is testimony to the internalization by the president of broader issues such as 
monetary and fiscal stability.
20  
The Cardoso administration viewed pension reform as urgent because since 1997 
contributions of workers no longer covered the expenditures on pensions. The fiscal 
demand of funding pensions is in part reflected in the borrowing costs of the government 
and has perverse consequences for price stability and continued economic growth. Outside 
observers (economists in academia, the World Bank and IMF and the press) have noted the 
lavish and unsustainable nature of Brazil’s pension system.  
The Brazilian pension system has broken just about every rule known to actuaries. It 
fixes no minimum retirement age, and allows a host of exceptions and special cases. It 
allows retired people (called, wonderfully inaccurately, "inactive workers") not only to 
draw more than one pension but also to go on getting a wage as well. Perhaps uniquely, 
Brazil not only allows some pensioners to retire on a higher income than they had when 
working, but also increases their pension every time their working colleagues get a wage 
rise. (The Economist, June 7, 1997). 
 
  Although the need for change is not controversial, the devil is in the details. Those 
who are already retired and those who are currently in the workforce have come to see the 
benefits promised by the current rules as a property right. The courts have tended to agree. 
Any solution necessarily implies redistribution and generates opposition, which is reflected 
in Congress. In addition, many Congressmen have a direct stake in pension reform; 120 
members of the 518-seat house collect pensions.
21 
<<Place Table 1 about here>> 
  The first defeat to the Executive’s pension reform occurred in March 1996. The 
proposed bill addressed some of the more blatant distortions of the pension system. It 
required 35 years of contributions for men and 30 years for women, rather than simply Alston 
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years of service. In the private sector there was no age requirement for retirement but in the 
public sector the bill imposed a minimum retirement age of 55 for men and 50 for women, 
which would be increased to 60 and 55 in 2001. The bill would have capped pensions for 
the private sector at 10 times the minimum wage (approximately US$1000). Civil servants 
would continue to receive the same as their pre-retirement wage but the current 20% bonus 
on retirement would be deleted. The bill also eliminated the accumulation of multiple 
pensions. Elected politicians who retired from another job were allowed to continue to 
receive a salary in addition to their pension. 
Many issues in pension reform require a Constitutional amendment, which entails a 
three-fifths majority of the House (308 of the 513 deputies) and the bill must be approved 
in two separate votes in both the House and the Senate. After the first vote in the House the 
government came up fourteen votes short. President Cardoso responded quickly and sent a 
new bill to Congress in two weeks. This time Cardoso was very careful about his strategy. 
He attenuated some of the more controversial parts of the reform and made intense use of 
patronage, leading to passage in the House: 
For  the  next  two  weeks,  the  President  went  to  work.  He  held  a  meeting  with  64  PPB 
congressmen,  hosted  a  gala  luncheon  with  one  leading  critic  in  the  PMDB,  and  made 
telephone calls to state governors. Just what went on behind closed doors is anyone's guess, 
though the evidence is mounting that it was plenty. By March 21st, order was restored. The 
lower house backed the welfare reform. 
So all's well? Not quite. The welfare reform has been weakened, to tinker with 
encrusted  privileges  not  dismantle  them…  Still,  "we  made  the  only  advance  that  was 
possible," said a relieved Mr Cardoso, thanking the legislators who supported him. And he 
paid for it.  ... 
Pork  was  on  the  menu  in  several  states.  The  first  time  round,  all  seven 
congressmen from Rondonia, a small state in the Amazon, voted against the government's 
welfare reform. After a cordial chat at the Planalto, all seven changed their minds. Soon 
$16m in federal cash will go to improve an important road in Rondonia, and one of the 
state's favourite sons will be heading the local arm of the federal telephone company. Pure 
coincidence, say officials in Brasilia. The drought-parched north-eastern state of Paraiba 
won money for an irrigation canal and reservoirs. A power plant was promised for Rio 
Grande do Sul. The government was no less open-handed with jobs and promotions. (The 
Economist, March 30, 1996) 
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  The difficulties encountered in approving pension reform signaled to the 
government that the successful completion of more of its reforms would be a more 
demanding task than had been anticipated. In the following month Cardoso reshuffled the 
cabinet so as to strengthen the government’s base of support in Congress. In addition 
Cardoso created a Special Ministry for Political Coordination whose purpose was to 
intermediate and facilitate the channeling of the demands of coalition members to the 
Executive, and the distribution of patronage in return for political support (Fleischer, 1998, 
pg. 91). Keeping track of each legislator’s demands and voting performance is a formidable 
task so it is natural that means to do this more effectively would be sought. To better 
monitor legislative behavior over time the Ministry of Political Coordination created the 
System of Legislative Performance (SIAL) that centralized all requests by legislators to any 
governmental agency or Ministry, thus preventing any double granting of patronage or any 
omission (Pereira, 1999, pg. 107-108). In announcing the creation of the ministry President 
Cardoso justified that “… when Congress wants to say yes and can’t manage to do so it is 
necessary that we get together to create conditions to make the dialogue flow better” (O 
Estado de São Paulo, April 30 1996).
22 
  The second defeat to pension reform came in May 1998 when a proposal instituting 
a minimum retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women lost by one vote. The proposed 
legislation would have significantly reduced the government’s pension bill. The bill was 
defeated despite the Executive’s usual appeals and negotiation with its coalition in 
Congress, a sign of how divisive this issue was, particularly in an election year. After the 
upset the Executive announced that those deputies that had had their requests granted 
before the vote and didn’t keep their part of the bargain risked having their individual Alston 
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amendments to the budget shelved and their appointments to positions in the federal 
government reexamined (Gazeta Mercantil, May 8 1998). 
  Two weeks later the President sent another bill to Congress.
23 This time Cardoso 
changed the minimum age for retirement to 53 for men and 48 for women, valid only for 
those already in the social security system. In terms of our model this change can be seen as 
a compromise in the policy proposed by the government. The defeat in the House showed 
that the coalition’s preferences, which are for a much lower age, were more intense than 
expected. Even the negotiation of patronage did not guarantee the approval of the bill. 
Rather than simply offer more patronage to assure the next vote, the Executive opted to 
mitigate the age requirements. The new bill was approved and finally sealed in a second 
vote in November 1998. For this final vote the Executive took no risks: 
President Cardoso dispensed with his trademark aloofness of his first term and openly 
pushed for his program, meeting with party leaders and sending telegrams summoning 
coalition members to vote. A bloc of 37 legislators representing agricultural businesses 
was promised by the Government that it would delay repayment of more than $1 billion 
in farmers' debt in return for their votes, said Hugo Biehl, leader of the farmers' bloc in 
Congress. The Government also granted farm businesses $280 million in concessions in 
exchange for their support. (The New York Times, November 6 1998.) 
 
Having exhausted his options regarding age requirements, the President turned to 
addressing two different margins of pension reform: the size of the tax on income for 
pensions and the number of taxpayers. This was especially important to the President 
because it would provide some immediate financial relief at a time of imminent monetary 
crisis.
24 In December 1998 the House voted to increase pension contributions of civil 
servants from 11% to 20% of their wages, and also to start taxing the pensions of retired 
civil servants. This measure would provide an added U$2.2 billion dollars to the 
government’s coffers over the next year. This measure was bitterly opposed by civil 
servants who already saw their contributions as too high, and by the retired who saw their 
pensions as too low. The measure was defeated in the House: Alston 
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As the vote on the pension approached, some coalition allies jostled for Cabinet posts. 
Others  fielded  calls  from  opponents  of  the  bill.  One  hundred  legislators  just  stayed 
away. … Political analysts say the pension bill failed because the Government, overly 
confident, neglected the legwork to rally support. The administration also packed too 
much into one measure, focusing on active and retired government workers along with 
other groups because of time pressure. (The New York Times, December 12 1998.) 
 
  In the following month Congress called off its summer recess in an effort to vote a 
series of backlogged bills. At the same time Cardoso changed several ministerial 
appointments in order to adapt his Cabinet to changes in the newly elected Congress that 
would commence in two months. In part, due to the failed pension reform the pressure on 
the Real became overwhelming and Brazil set the Real afloat, resulting in a large 
devaluation.  
Under this scenario Cardoso sent to the House a new measure to increase the 
pension contributions of active and retired civil servants. This time the Executive argued 
that pension reform was necessary to pull the country out of the economic crisis arising 
from the devaluation of the Real. In addition the heightened need for the measure made 
Cardoso more willing to exchange pork for support. Congress approved the bill by a safe 
margin and instituted the new contributions immediately. But, a few months later (October 
1999) the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional, forcing the government to 
revert to previous levels of contributions and return the additional revenue that it had 
obtained. Cardoso threatened to change the Constitution so as to allow higher levels of 
contributions but sensing the difficulty of getting these changes through Congress 
attempted only minor changes to the pension system during the remainder of his term 
In January 2003 the new Lula government stepped into office and immediately 
announced that pensions would be the first major reform it would address. Lula hoped to 
make the most of his high level of popularity and the momentum from his electoral victory 
to tackle pension reform, taking advantage of the  sense that a left wing government would Alston 
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have greater legitimacy to impose the kinds of fiscal changes that are necessary 
(Abranches, 2003:62). Interest groups immediately mobilized to pressure against losing 
their so-called “acquired rights.” Federal judges, civil servants and the military were quick 
to express their opposition to losing their privileges. By the end of 2003 the government 
had succeeded in passing pension reform through Congress.
25 
 
Evidence on the Strategic use of Individual Budget Amendments 
  In this section we analyze the relationship between the voting behavior of the 
Deputies and the execution of their budget amendments by the President. In Brazil the 
Executive first proposes the yearly budget and then it passes through Congress where it can 
be amended by legislators. The amendments generally consist of expenditures in the 
Congressmen’s district, with the hope of yielding both votes and rents from constituents.
26  
Following passage of the budget in Congress, the bill goes back to the President who has 
discretion over implementation. The process gives the President enormous leverage for 
rewards and punishments. The President frequently shelves some amendments on the 
grounds that tax receipts are insufficient to cover all expenditures, though in many 
instances there appears to be little fiscal merit to his veto.  
  One of the implications of our model is that there should be a direct link between 
the voting behavior of the members of Congress and the execution of their individual 
budget amendments. In order to test this implication we focus on one particular instance 
when the President had a proposal rejected and a couple of weeks later submitted a new 
attenuated proposal that Congress approved. The specific case, already described above, 
involved a second round defeat in the House of establishing a minimum age for retirement 
of 60 for men and 55 for women (May 6, 1998), and the subsequent approval of a minimum Alston 
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age of 53 for men and 48 for women (May 23, 1998). Our strategy is to regress the 
percentage of the total value of each deputy’s amendments that were executed in 1998 on a 
series of variables that should affect the President’s decision whether to execute those 
amendments. The key explanatory variables will be two dummies: 1) those deputies who 
switched their vote from no, against the President’s proposal to yes in favor of the 
President’s proposal; and 2) those deputies who switched their vote from yes in favor of the 
President’s proposal to no, against the President’s proposal. For pension reform a 
supermajority is needed. The first vote tallied 307 in favor, 148 against and 11 abstentions, 
missing the 308 approval mark by 1 vote. The second vote tallied 333 – 149 – 3, with 15 
switching from no to yes and 9 from yes to no, the balance being explained by abstentions 
and absences.
27 
The other explanatory variables are: (i) Votes - the percentage of times the deputy 
voted favorable to the President’s position in the 1995-1998 period; (ii) Exec. Amend. 1997 
- the percentage of the total value of individual budget amendments that were executed in 
the previous year, 1997; (iii) Position - a dummy that equals 1 if the deputy held a powerful 
position within Congress during that year, such as speaker, party leader, committee 
president or rapporteur; (iv) N
0 Amendments - the number of amendments submitted by the 
deputy that year; and (v) Seniority – the number of terms served by the deputy. 
Votes should capture the degree to which the President uses the execution of the 
budget amendments to reward and punish those who vote for or against his proposals.  To 
control for the endogeneity of voting behavior we estimated Votes simultaneously using 
instruments, including dummies identifying whether the deputy was a member of a party in 
the core coalition, on the fringe of the coalition or in the opposition.
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Exec. Amend. 1997 should capture any persistent capacity to get amendments 
executed. For example, a given deputy might have a more capable staff than others, which 
can affect her chances of execution. The Position and Seniority variables should capture the 
effect of influence and experience, and the N
0 Amendments is primarily a control variable 
and should measure whether those who propose more amendments have a greater or lesser 
likelihood of having amendments executed.  
<<Place Table 2 about here>> 
 
<<Place Table 3 about here>> 
We present descriptive statistics and results in Tables 1 and 2. Deputies who voted 
in accord with the President received more pork in terms of budgetary amendments. A 10 
percentage point increase in Votes (.4 of the standard deviation) increased the proportion of  
the value of a deputy’s amendments that were executed by almost 3%. Not surprisingly 
there appears to be considerable stasis in the reception of pork as indicated by the 
coefficient on Exec. Amend. 1997. This may partially explain why the coefficients on 
Position and Seniority are not reliably different from zero. Of course this does not rule out 
that Position and Seniority have pay-offs other than budget amendment execution. The 
coefficient on N
0 Amendments is small; an additional amendment leads to an increase of 
only 0.42% in the value of total amendments that are executed.
29  
The results of most importance for our model of exchange of pork for policy are the 
coefficients No to Yes and Yes to No. Switching votes from opposition to the President’s 
proposal for establishing a minimum age for retirement to support for a minimum age 
increases the value of amendments by 11%. Changing votes from yes to no had less of an 
impact but was still reasonably large: a 5% decrease in pork. Overall the results are Alston 
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consistent with our expectations and when combined with the qualitative evidence indicate 
a strong case in favor of our model of gains from trade between legislators and the 
President.  
Finally we test result 4 of our model: the President will deliver more benefits to 
legislators who are in the coalition but further from his preferences than he will to those 
who are closer. To do this we use the index created by Leoni (2000, 2002) as a measure of 
the “ideological” position of each legislator and the President.
30 This index is the first 
dimension of a W-Nominate procedure (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985) which alone typically 
explains over 90% of the variation of deputies’ votes in Brazil (Leoni, 2002). It can be 
interpreted as the deputies’ position on a left-right spatial dimension. Our test consists of 
explaining the value of each deputy’s congressionally approved amendments that the 
President chose to execute in the 51
nd legislature (1999-2002). For the test we fitted a 
polynomial equation using the absolute value of the distance of each deputy to the 
President.
31 This strategy allows for a non-linear relationship between the distance of each 
deputy to the President and the value of patronage received through amendments. Thus we 
can see whether the President distributes benefits based on the ideological distance of the 
deputy from the President. We are most interested in whether deputies who are slightly 
further away receive more than those that are very close and very far. For 1999 and 2000 
(Cardoso years) the predicted relationship between executed amendments and distance to 
the President exhibited a pattern where the value of amendments first increased and then 
decreased as the deputies became more divergent from the President’s preferences, see 
figure 5.
32  For 2001 and 2002 we found the same relationship but the statistical reliability 
was weak.
33    
  <<Place Figure 4 about here>> Alston 
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  Though this test is supportive of our model we stress that our statistical test only 
controls for the value of amendments as pork whereas the President has several other forms 
of patronage to trade, such as posts in government, as well as instruments to punish deviant 
behavior. Nevertheless the results suggest that the “prodigal son” effect may hold.  
Section 5 – Conclusion 
  The media in Brazil commonly laments the exchange of pork for policy. Such 
complaints ignore the counterfactual: in the absence of exchanging pork for policy the 
President would accomplish less of his policy agenda and policies would be either highly 
unstable or in gridlock. One could conceive of some other Congressional institution, such 
as strong committees, as stabilizing policy. But, because of a differing electoral connections 
between votes and policies, Presidential power as the stabilizing factor has the advantage 
that the President, more so than members of Congress, should place a higher weight in his 
utility function on the national interests of economic growth, income equality, economic 
opportunity and price stabilization. The concerns of Congressmen are more likely more 
parochial because Congressmen are in less of a position to internalize the gains from 
growth enhancing policies whereas they do internalize the benefits from pork. With the 
extant Congressional institutions in place, if Congress curtailed the power of the President 
we envision even more pork and less prudent developmental policies. 
  Prior to the new administration of Lula, the institutionally driven exchange model 
that we present could not be separated from the administration of Cardoso. Fortunately for 
us the new Lula government has behaved remarkably consistent with our model. After 8 
years of fierce criticism and opposition to the policies of the Cardoso administration, Lula 
in his first year in office has proposed objectives very similar to Cardoso, e.g., pension 
reform and more independence for the Central Bank. Though the proposed policies have Alston 
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surprised some analysts and irritated radicals within the Lula’s party, Lula’s agenda is 
consistent with the extant incentives derived from the existence of strong Presidential 
powers stipulated in the 1988 Constitution of Brazil.  Alston 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Chronology of Pension Reform  
Date  Event 
1993 
 
Congress initiates constitutional reforms. 
1995 
Mar.1 




Pension reform proposal sent to Congress. 
1995 
April 
Committee of Constitution and Justice approves pension reform proposal. 
1996 
Mar.6 
Pension reform proposal instituting minimum years of contribution to the pension system was 
rejected in the House.  The vote was 294 in favor 190 against and 8 abstentions (approval of 
Constitutional amendments require 308 in favor.) 
1996 
Mar. 21 
Pension reform proposal approved in the House after intense use of patronage. 
 (351 – 139 – 2). 
1996 
April 12 
Supreme Court judge accepts injunction by the opposition suspending the legislative 




Extraordinary Ministry for Political Coordination created. 
1996 
May 8 
Supreme Court overrules injunction suspending pension reform deliberations. 
1998 
Feb.11 
Constitutional amendment approved in the House setting minimum age to retire at 60 for 
men and 55 for women. (345 – 152 - 3) Previously there was no minimum age only the 
requirement of having worked for 35 years for men and 30 for women. 
1998 
May 6 
Constitutional amendment establishing minimum age for retiring was rejected in its second 
voting in the House. (307 – 148 – 11). 
1998 
May 23 
Minimum retirement age of 53 for men and 48 for women (for those already in the social 
security system) approved in the House.   
1998 
Nov.5 
House approves minimum retirement ages of 53 for men and 48 for women in its second 
passage through the House. (346 – 131 – 3) 
A ceiling for public sector pensions was allowed. 
Intense negotiations with deputies proceeded the vote. 
1998 
Dec.3 
House rejects Constitutional amendment increasing contributions of active civil servants from 
11% to 20%, and of retired civil servants who receive above R$1,200 from 0% to 11%. (187 – 
209 – 7; government need 200 votes to approve provisional decree.) Loss estimated at US$2.2 
billion per year. 
1998 
Dec.12 
House approves a bill to increase pension contributions from charities, churches, hospitals, 
schools and small businesses. 
1999 
Jan. 4 
Ministerial reform is undertaken to help approve fiscal adjustment plan. 
1999 
Jan. 14 
Real is allowed to float suffers large devaluation. 
1999 
Jan. 20 
House approves law that increases contributions by active and retired civil servants. (335 – 
147 – 4).  Once again patronage was intensely negotiated. 
1999 
Oct. 1  
The Supreme Court declares unconstitutional the previous law raising the contributions of 
active and retired civil servants. 
1999 
Oct 6. 




Supreme Court ruled that law altering private pension calculations is constitutional. 
2001 - 
2002 
Proposal to amend the Constitution so as to overcome the Supreme Court ruling against 
increasing contributions of active and retired civil servants is stalled in Congress. Alston 




Lula government takes office places pension reform at the top of the agenda. The reform that 
is approved in this year is very similar to that which had been proposed by FHC 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable  Mean  Stand. Dev.  Min  Max 
Exec. Amend. 
1998 
20.534  21.054  0.00  98.450 
Votes  0.766  0.258  0.048  1.00 
Exec. Amend. 
1997 
52.019  33.128  0.00  100.00 
Position  0.310  0.463  0.00  1.00 
N
0 Amend.  3.149  4.009  0.00  27.00 
Seniority  1.936  1.289  0.00  8.00 
No to Yes  0.248  0.155  0.00  1.00 
Yes to No  0.015  0.121  0.00  1.00 
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Table 3: The Determinants of Cardoso’s Execution of Amendments of Deputies, 1998 
 
  Dep. Var.: Executed 
Amendments 1998 
Constant  -4.822 
(-1.17) 
Votes       27.341 *** 
(5.54) 
Exec. Amen. 1997        0.106 *** 
(3.15) 
Position  -0.458 
(-0.22) 
N
0 Amendments    0.428 * 
(1.61) 
Seniority  -0.189 
(-0.22) 
No to Yes    11.373 * 
(1.78) 
Yes to No    -5.479 * 
(-1.63) 
R
2  0.08 
N  426 
t-stat. in parenthesis. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
Two-stage least squares estimation. 
Covariance matrix is White’s robust, heteroscedasticity 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
   € For comments, we thank James Bang, William Bernhard, Aécio Cunha, David Fleischer, 
Mark Kohl, Fernando Limongi, Marcus Melo, Kara Norlin, Carlos Pereira, David Samuels, 
Emilson Silva, Douglass Stinnet, two anonymous reviewers the editor of the journal and 
participants at the following conferences and seminars: Tulane University, University of 
Paris X, “Neoliberalism and Its Consequences,” ANPEC 2001 and LACEA 2001. We 
thank the Hewlett Foundation and CNPq for financial support. 
1 The College of Leaders is composed of the President of the House, the leaders of all 
parties, and a non-voting deputy appointed by the President.  It arose informally during the 
drafting of the 1988 Constitution in order to expedite deliberations. Party leaders met prior 
to the constitutional sessions to negotiate the proposals that would be taken to the floor.  
The College seemed to suit the preferences of the party leaders and it became 
institutionalized in the House’s legislative regiment in 1989 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1996: 
31-36). The College of Leaders has close control of the legislative agenda deciding which 
bills are taken to the floor. One of its main instruments for this purpose is the use of 
urgency petitions (discharge petition), which take a bill from a committee and put it in the 
next day’s order of business to be voted on the floor. Decisions within the College of 
Leaders are taken by majority vote weighted by the proportion of deputies in each party, so 
that the majority coalition is able to control the decision making process.  
2 For descriptions and analysis of the organization of the Brazilian Congress see: 
Figueiredo and Limongi (1996, 2000a), Pereira and Mueller (2000), Pereira (1999). 
3 Issuing provisional decrees may be a low cost way of establishing policy and should not 
be interpreted as absolute power by the President. Given the veto power of Congress, the Alston 
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President must be establishing decrees that make a majority of members of Congress better 
off.   
4 In 2002 Congress changed the rules governing the use of decree power were changed, 
diminishing the president’s discretion. Nevertheless provisional decrees are still a key 
policy instrument for the executive. 
5 The provisional decrees are not necessarily in areas where the President has exclusive 
rights of initiation.  
6 Figueiredo and Limongi (2000b) argue that the members of the Combined Budget 
Committee are part of the coalition within Congress that aligns itself to the President. 
7 See Amorim Neto (1994 and 2000) for analysis of cabinet appointments in Brazil. 
8 See Figueiredo and Limongi (1996 and 2000a) for descriptive statistics. Some of the 
proposals may be strategically watered down or withheld by the president as suggested by 
Ames (2001). Nevertheless the record for the Brazilian presidents since 1988 and for 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso in particular are still impressive.  The model presented in the 
next section explicitly shows how and when these trade-offs occur. 
9 This thesis is defended for example by Monteiro (1997) and Pessanha (1997), cited in 
Amorim Neto (2000: pg.8) and by Monteiro (2000a,b). 
10 This is a controversial issue among students of Brazilian politics. The existence of party 
discipline within Congress has been strongly argued by Figueiredo and Limongi (1996, 
2000a, pg.162). Examining the data for the period of 1989-98 they show that when a party 
in the coalition supported the President, its individual members generally did too, and when 
the party did not support the President on an issue, most members followed the party. The 
lack of party discipline on the other hand has been argued by Ames (1995a,b, 2001), 
Mainwaring (1993, 1999), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Lamounier (1994a,b).  Alston 
  - 55 - 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
11 Leoni (2000 and 2002), applied the W-NOMINATE procedure (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997) to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies using roll call data from 1988 to 1998. His 
results show that the first spatial dimension explains over 90% of the deputies’ individual 
votes for the 50
th legislature (F.H. Cardoso, 1995-98). This justifies the use of a single 
dimensional policy issue in the model presented here. Also, the results show a clear spatial 
divide between the government’s coalition (PMDB, PSDB, PPB, PTB and PFL) and the 
opposition. Considering the first dimension the spatial location of the medians of the major 
parties in the 50
th legislature are as follows (range from –1 to1): 
 PT -0.826, PDT -0.514, PMDB 0.435, PSDB 0.457, PPB 0.518, PTB 0.546, PFL 0.682. 
12 We thank an anonymous referee for suggestions on modifications to our original model.  
13 The empirical section of this paper will use pension reform to test our model and 
retirement age was one of the major policy concerns of Cardoso and now Lula. Both 
Presidents preferred a higher minimum age than the median of each of the parties. 
14 Note that this is different from 
) (⋅ SQ
i K . 
15 If there were a coordinating mechanism within the coalition that would enable them to 
credibly commit to a veto even when the President’s offer was in the interest of some 
members then the coalition would be a position to extract the lion’s share of the gains from 
trade.  
16 There may also be a public opinion component to this cost given that the media tends to 
denounce the use of patronage as if it were less than legitimate. 
17 Clearly this creates an incentive for coalition members to falsify their preferences so as to 
obtain more patronage and a disincentive for the like-minded parties to remain loyal.  
Because our model is a one-shot game it cannot be used to address this issue, which is Alston 
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inherently dynamic. However, we note once again that these perverse incentives are partly 
checked by the recurring nature of the relationship as well as (when this is the case) by the 
existence of a supramajority. Also, in a congressional setting it is not easy for a legislator to 
falsify his/her preferences as their history, past behavior, constituency links etc. are 
constantly scrutinized and are consequently well known by other players. 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing Synder’s article to our attention. 
19 Other authors that have stressed the importance of patronage in executive-legislative 
relations in Brazil include Ames (1995a,b), Amorim Neto (1994, 2000), Figueiredo and 
Limongi (1996), Pereira (1999), Santos (1997). 
20 Although the major objective of reforming the pension system should be to avoid the 
bankruptcy of the social security system and to establish a system that is fair and feasible, it 
is probable that the President may be primarily concerned with reducing the large deficits 
generated by the system, which have important short term consequences on the economy’s 
performance for which the president is seen as directly responsible by voters. 
21 David Fleischer cited in Associated Press (1999). 
22 The creation of the Special Ministry for Political Coordination is consistent with Result 2 
from our model: changes that reduce the cost of transacting between the Executive and the 
coalition, lead to greater gains from trade and policy outcomes more favorable to the 
Executive. The purpose of the new ministry was to facilitate transactions and thereby 
prevent future defeats in Congress. 
23 Below we examine the impact of the votes on pension reform May 6 and May 23 of 1998 
on the President’s approval of budgetary amendments. 
24 By this time there was a widespread belief that the Brazilian Real was substantially 
overvalued.  Alston 
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25 It is noteworthy that a left-wing government that strongly opposed the reform proposed 
by its successor, adopted basically the same proposal and pursued it in Congress using the 
same methods based on distribution of patronage, which it customarily criticized as 
immoral and illegitimate. This behavior is consistent with our framework of executive-
legislative relations in Brazil, as it postulates that the actors’ behavior is determined by 
political institutions. Because these institutions did not change it is reassuring that political 
behavior also remained the same. 
26 Samuels (2002) argues that the relationship between pork and re-election is indirect. In 
return for pork, e.g. a construction contract, a construction company will give money for 
financing a campaign which in turn improves the probability of a Congressmen of being re-
elected.  
27 Considering abstentions and absences as strategic did not significantly alter our results. 
28 Our determination of which instruments to use was based on the assumption that being a 
member of the coalition or not affects how a deputy votes, which in turn affects the 
execution of the deputy’s amendments.   
29 It could be argued that the choice of how many amendments to submit is affected by the 
deputy’s expectation of having them approved and executed, in which case this variable is 
endogenous. Treating N
0 Amendments as endogenous reduced the size and significance of 
the coefficient by did not affect the other results. 
30 See footnote 12. We thank Eduardo Leoni for calculating the index for the 51
st legislature 
for us. 
31 For this period we did not have the index for the President so we used instead the index 
of the government’s leader in the House (Arnaldo Madeira), which was 0.74 on a scale Alston 
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from –1 to 1. This would put the President in the 25
th rightmost spot amongst 
approximately 600 deputies.  
32 The estimated relationships are: 
1999  Value Executed = 722,453.14 + 412,215.91 Distance – 464,762.25 Distance
2 
                                         (5.69)             (2.44)                           (-4.64)                                   
R
2 = 0.31 
2000  Value Executed = 854,654.89 + 566,766.21 Dist. – 1,252,438.89 Dist.
2 + 447,512.19 Dist.
3 
                                      (8.14)           (2.00)                       (-2.92)                  (2.52)          
R
2=0.35 
Ordinary least squares. t-stats in parenthesis. Includes regional dummies and controls for 
the number of amendments proposed by each deputy. Value is measured in 1,000 Reais, 
data from Pires Jr. (2004). 
 
33 This could be due to the use of other Presidential powers, e.g. the use of patronage. We 
did find very similar results for the earlier 50
st legislature. We chose not to report those 
results because instead of value of amendments we only have data on the proportion of the 
value of approved amendments that were appropriated. 